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 Abstract 
This article will examine the implications of taking an autonomy approach to 
reproductive health policy and practice, and the value of shifting to an equality 
approach.  In legal terms, the acknowledgement that reproductive control is often 
a s. 15 equality matter, not simply a s. 7 concern, could lead to drastically 
different health care services.  The author will begin by explaining R. v. 
Morgentaler (1988), the case which set the precedent that reproductive health is a 
s. 7 concern—that is, an autonomy matter.  The author will identify some current 
conditions in the context of reproductive health in order to illustrate the 
shortcomings to s. 7.  Specifically, she will demonstrate the importance that 
government take positive action rather than uphold a position of non-interference.  
The subsequent section will make a case for redressing present conditions via the 
invocation of s. 15 equality rights.  The author will conclude with an evaluation of 
s. 15, considering the objection that not even this section can guarantee positive 
action.   
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This article will examine the implications of taking an autonomy approach 
to reproductive health policy and practice, and the value of shifting to an equality 
approach.  In legal terms, the acknowledgement that reproductive control is often 
a s. 15 equality matter, not simply a s. 7 concern, could lead to drastically 
different health care services.  I will begin by explaining R. v. Morgentaler 
(1988), the case which set the precedent that reproductive health is a s. 7 
concern—that is, an autonomy matter.  I will identify some current conditions in 
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the context of reproductive health in order to illustrate the shortcomings to s. 7.  
Specifically, I will demonstrate the importance that government take positive 
action rather than uphold a position of non-interference.  The subsequent section 
will make a case for redressing present conditions via the invocation of s. 15 
equality rights.  I will conclude with an evaluation of s. 15, considering the 
objection that not even this section can guarantee positive action.   
Autonomy Jurisprudence  
 The following section will explain the landmark decision made in R. v. 
Morgentaler (1988), when legal reproductive autonomy was first established as 
an important precedent in Canadian law.  My purpose here will be to mount the 
argument that s. 7 is grounded in a concept of personal autonomy—one which 
requires non-interference in order to be realized.  In this case, Drs. Henry 
Morgentaler, Leslie Frank Smoling, and Robert Scott were charged with illegally 
inducing miscarriages at a Toronto clinic, thus violating s. 251(4) in the Criminal 
Code.  Under the Criminal Code, abortion was considered an indictable offense 
unless it was performed in a hospital by a doctor, and was approved by a 
committee of physicians who determined that the medical treatment would serve 
the purpose of saving a pregnant woman’s life.  Initially, the appellants argued 
that the Criminal Code was “inconsistent with s. 1(b) of the Canadian Bill of 
Rights” (p. 3), but as their cases proceeded the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms was introduced into Canadian jurisprudence.  The Supreme Court 
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considered whether s. 251 infringed on s. 2(a) freedom of conscience; s. 7 rights 
to life, liberty, and security of the person; and s. 12 right not to be subject to cruel 
and unusual punishment.  The Supreme Court majority of 5 to 2 agreed that s. 251 
infringed on women’s s. 7 right, and the deprivation of this right was not in 
accordance with the principles of fundamental justice
3
.  It was also determined 
that the violation did not satisfy s. 1 of the Charter
4
. 
Introduced by then Justice Minister Pierre Elliot Trudeau in 1969, the 
amendment to the Criminal Code was progressive for its time, for it paved the 
way for the decriminalization of abortion.  Previously an offense for which 
women could receive life imprisonment, abortion came to be legal as long as a 
committee comprised of at least three medical professionals could determine that 
the pregnant woman’s physical, mental, or emotional health was endangered by 
the pregnancy: “[abortion was possible if] the continuation of the pregnancy of 
such female person would or would be likely to endanger her life or health”.  
Morgentaler and his associates violated the Criminal Code by setting up “a clinic 
                                                          
3
 More broadly, s. 7 protects “the right to life, liberty, and security of the person 
and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles 
of fundamental justice”.   
4
 Cases alleging Charter violations undergo a two-step process.  First, the Court 
determines whether a Charter right has been infringed upon.  If this is the case, 
the next step is to determine whether this infringement can be saved by s. 1 of the 
Charter, which reads: “The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees 
the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits 
prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic 
society”.   
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to perform abortions upon women who had not obtained a certificate from a 
therapeutic abortion committee of an accredited or approved hospital” (R. v. 
Morgentaler, 1988, p. 2-3).  They did so because, as indicated by their public 
statements, they questioned “the wisdom of the abortion laws in Canada and 
[asserted] that a woman has an unfettered right to choose whether or not an 
abortion is appropriate in her individual circumstances” (p. 3).     
Those in the Supreme Court majority wrote three different rulings; some 
of the rhetoric used in these rulings is pertinent to autonomy jurisprudence.  
Accompanied by J. Lamer, Chief Justice Dickson wrote that s. 251 “forces 
women to carry a fetus to term contrary to their own priorities and aspirations and 
which imposes serious delay causing increased physical and psychological trauma 
to those women who meet its criteria” (p. 63).  This language invokes associations 
with autonomy theory.  According to the liberal theories in which autonomy finds 
its home (Hobbes, 1985; Locke, 1980; Mill, 1978), the concept refers to self-rule 
or self-direction (autos—self; nomos—government), whereby one makes 
personal, important decisions based on one’s own values, principles, and purposes 
(Christman, 1991; Dworkin, 1988; Lukes, 1973).     
Although C.J. Dickson cautioned against a broad application of s. 7 and 
the explicit connection with personal autonomy, security of the person can still be 
understood to have the power to protect reproductive autonomy.  The Chief 
Justice also ruled that the criminalization of abortion ran contrary to women’s 
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priorities and aspirations, and so security of the person, even narrowly defined, 
refers to a corporeal autonomy the range of which extends to reproductive 
activities.  McLeod (2002) discusses the effect of interference with reproductive 
autonomy: “if little respect is given to women’s autonomy...they will lack control 
over how they reproduce or attempt to reproduce” (p. 2).  She thus links 
autonomy with reproductive control.  Indeed, reproductive decisions are 
necessarily grounded in women’s bodies and reproductive capacities, and how 
freely made those decisions are has a tremendous effect on the physical and 
psychological hardship a woman might endure.  Purdy (2006) explains the 
significance of ensuring women control their own bodies: “autonomy is 
particularly important for women...because reproduction still takes place in 
women’s bodies, and because they are generally expected to take primary 
responsibility for child rearing” (p. 287).  If a woman lacks access to abortion 
services, for instance, she must carry a pregnancy to term, resulting in a drastic 
transformation of her body and a lack of control over what happens to her body.  
She may also face psychological hardship, in that stigma is sometimes associated 
with pregnancy, and she will have to make potentially difficult, painful, life-
altering decisions regarding what happens after birth.   
According to J. Wilson (who was in the majority but wrote one of the 
three separate majority rulings), s. 251 violated s. 7 rights to security of the person 
and liberty.  She explained the violation of liberty in the following way: “Liberty 
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in a free and democratic society does not require the state to approve the personal 
decisions made by its citizens; it does, however, require the state to respect them” 
(p. 167)
5.  She made explicit references to the concept of autonomy: “The right to 
‘liberty’ contained in s. 7 guarantees to every individual a degree of personal 
autonomy over important decisions intimately affecting their private lives” (p. 
37).  For her, every right and freedom in the Charter is underpinned with the idea 
that “the state will respect choices made by individuals and, to the greatest extent 
possible, will avoid subordinating these choices to any one conception of the good 
life” (p. 37).  That is, every right and freedom, including s. 7, to some degree is 
designed to respect autonomous decisions, as long as autonomy is understood as 
self-direction, the condition by which people make choices freely, unhampered.   
The Shortcomings to Reproductive Autonomy Rights 
While the 1988 Morgentaler case marks a historic victory for reproductive 
rights in Canada, current conditions and policies today make clear that not enough 
has been done to protect and facilitate reproductive rights.  Gavigan (1992) argues 
that Canadian case law on reproductive rights is inconsistent with the rhetoric 
taken up by feminist movements:   
The language of the Morgentaler judgments of the majority was a 
ringing restatement of an individual right to life, liberty, and 
security of the person and is thus consistent with the emphasis on 
                                                          
5
 Justice Wilson further argued that the decision to terminate a pregnancy was 
“essentially a moral decision, a matter of conscience” (p. 175) and thus s. 251 also 
violated the Charter’s s. 2(a) freedom of conscience.    
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abortion as a private and individual matter.  While this reflects the 
language of lawyers and judges, it has not been the characterization 
of Canadian pro-choice and feminist activists, who have 
consistently framed abortion as an issue of equality and access (p. 
222). 
 
There are important implications to characterizing reproductive rights as 
individual rights.  According to Dunsmuir’s (1998) analysis of J. Wilson’s 
decision: “the state is required only to respect such decisions [to terminate 
pregnancies], or to refrain from interfering with them, not to approve or facilitate 
them” (unpaginated).  That is, in the case of reproductive rights, s. 7 protections 
cannot guarantee positive state obligations that would provide the resources 
women need in order to make reproductive choices.  The protection of personal 
autonomy only requires that the state not interfere.   
Indeed, despite the decriminalization and constitutional protection of 
abortion, access to abortion services in Canada continues to be limited.  Granted, 
abortion is considered a medically necessary procedure by all provincial and 
territorial colleges of physicians and surgeons in Canada.  Inasmuch as abortion is 
a medically necessary procedure, provinces and territories are bound by the 
Canada Health Act to provide free access to the service in order to qualify for 
their full federal funding for health care; however, federal governments have not 
taken measures to ensure that provinces and territories comply (Richer, 2008).  
The Liberal Independent Health Facilities Act (IHFA, 1990), originally 
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introduced in order to enable governments to regulate and facilitate the delivery of 
health services, once gave preference to funding non-profit, Canadian-owned 
providers such as abortion clinics; but with the Conservative Bill 26, this 
preference in the IHFA was removed, leading to a redefining of medically 
necessary services and extra billing for those no longer deemed medically 
necessary (Gilmour, 2002).  Says Gilmour: 
The IHFA might have provided a framework for increased 
availability of and choice in abortion services.  Owing to political 
pressures, fears of harassment and violence, limited resources and 
personnel, and disapproval or indifference, abortions are not 
available at many hospitals.  Often a free-standing clinic is 
women’s only option.  While the statute could have been employed 
to facilitate the establishment of independent health facilities 
performing the procedure, it was not (p. 286).   
  
 With lack of regulation, abortion access varies according to the province 
or territory.  Prince Edward Island lacks in-province abortion services, though 
women in the province can access funding for out-of-province services as long as 
they obtain a referral from their physician.  New Brunswick only offers abortions 
in hospital settings and requires that the procedures are performed by 
gynecologists, in the first trimester of pregnancy (the first 12 weeks), only after 
two physicians have deemed the procedure medically necessary.  Only British 
Columbia, Quebec, and Ontario provide abortions past 20 weeks of pregnancy.  In 
these provinces, waiting lists are varied, and are especially long for women in 
rural areas.  Prairie provinces typically offer services near the southern 
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US/Canada border, requiring that some women travel vast distances; they only 
offer in-hospital services, and only during the first trimester (Dunn, 2008). 
According to Gilmour, the Health Services Restructuring Committee 
(HSRC) poses another impediment to abortion access given its role in advising 
the Minister of Health on which hospitals to close due to funding concerns: “In 
some instances in Ontario, HSRC decisions resulted in the ‘winning’ hospitals 
(the survivors) being those with Roman Catholic affiliations” (p. 287).  She cites 
the merger of Pembroke Civic Hospital with Roman Catholic Pembroke General, 
and the redirecting of funds from the closed Wellesley General Hospital to a still 
thriving Saint Michael’s Hospital in Toronto.  As a result, “access to a number of 
reproductive health care services previously available at the Wellesley [has been 
eliminated]” (p. 288), including birth control, sex education, and abortion 
services.  Gilmour notes that decisions that favour Catholic hospitals in the 
restructuring of health care not only limit women’s options, but also express a 
judgment about abortion that may be internalized:  
[These institutional policies] carry with them an inherent judgment, 
the judgment of a publicly funded institution charged with carrying 
out government policy to provide comprehensive health care, that 
those seeking such services—primarily women—are also morally 
in the wrong, or at best misguided.  That is not a silent presence but 
an active judgment with real consequences and ramifications (p. 
288).  
 
Further, the discrimination inherent in reproductive access has been 
studied in government-sponsored reports, most notably the Badgley Report 
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(1977), commissioned before Morgentaler.  The Badgley Report identified social 
barriers that particularly had an impact on “socially vulnerable women—the 
young, less well educated and newcomers to Canada” (unpaginated).  Rodgers 
(2009), who has done extensive work mounting a defense of reproductive equality 
protections, explains that post-Morgentaler reports repeat the original findings in 
Badgley: “Thirty years after Badgley and twenty years after Morgentaler, 
ineffective and insufficient provision of abortion services continues to violate 
women’s Charter equality protections” (p. 28).  She describes these social 
barriers at length:  
There was documentation of racist delivery of abortion and 
reproductive health care services and of imposed contraception and 
sterilization.  The young, the poor, women with disabilities and 
aboriginal women, refugees and women of colour were noted as 
being particularly mistreated.  There was documented evidence of 
pressure to terminate a pregnancy or to use permanent forms of 
contraception such as sterilization or Depo-Provera for some 
women (2009, p. 26).   
 
It appears that even when reproductive services are available, the nature of 
the delivery of these services—be it racist, classist, ableist—has the potential to 
affect access.  The racialized woman who feels pressure to terminate her 
pregnancy, the woman who cannot reach the only hospital in the area with the 
necessary services because she cannot afford the transportation or the time off 
work, the woman whose wheelchair cannot tackle the clinic stairs—these are the 
women whose access is compromised.   
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Only in British Columbia do we see the limitation of political protests 
outside abortion clinics as well as abortion providers’ offices and homes, 
according to the Access to Abortion Services Act (1996).  Under s. 2 of the Act, 
while people are within what is designated an access zone, they must refrain from, 
among other items, “physically [interfering] with or [attempting] to interfere with 
a service provider, a doctor who provides abortion services or a patient” as well as 
“[intimidating] or [attempting] to intimidate a service provider, a doctor who 
provides abortion services or a patient”.  Graphic recordings and harassment are 
prohibited, under ss. 3 and 4, respectively.  What is the value of access zones?  
Firstly, having zones may mitigate violence.  Dr. Morgentaler’s Toronto clinic 
was firebombed in 1992; there have also been three shootings (British Columbia 
1994, Ontario 1995, and Manitoba 1997) targeting abortion service providers 
(CBC News, 2009).  Further, harassment and intimidation, even when they do not 
escalate to violence, serve the function of alienating those involved in abortion 
provisions.  Physicians may be frightened away from practicing the profession, 
leading to fewer services available to women; and women arriving at clinics 
already forced to make a difficult decision and undergo a difficult treatment may 
be made to feel guilt or fear.  Gavigan (2009) explains that those responsible for 
fear tactics are driven ideologically to limit abortion access, for ideology around 
fetal rights and irresponsible pregnant women has thrived in Canada despite 
lacking any legal grounding, and this ideology has the power to limit access in 
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ways that even the law has struggled to counter: “what is striking is that this 
campaign has been so successful without significant support in Canadian law” (p. 
132).    
A Case for Reproductive Equality 
Morgentaler and similar subsequent cases have missed a crucial detail: 
women’s inequality has throughout history been rooted in who controls their 
reproductive abilities: “Reproductive autonomy is key to women’s equality and 
essential to women’s full and constitutionally protected membership in the 
Canadian state” (Rodgers, 2006, p. 1).  If autonomy and equality are inseparable 
with respect to reproduction, then lack of autonomy, lack of control over their 
reproductive capacities, might help explain women’s experiences of historical 
inequality.  Colker (1992) elaborates: “It is because women are saddled with 
virtually all of the expenses of pregnancy and childbirth, as well as the costs of 
childcare, that we must insist that women be allowed to choose the conditions 
under which they become pregnant” (p. 85).  Women have been historically 
disadvantaged by socially produced responsibilities associated with pregnancy 
and parenting.  They have lacked control over their reproductive capacities due to 
policies and practices that reflected a lack of respect for the marginalized group 
they constitute.           
In legal terms, women might be better served if reproductive rights were 
also grounded in the s. 15 right to equality.  Under s. 15: 
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15(1) Every individual is equal before and under the law and has 
the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law 
without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination 
based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or 
mental or physical disability. 
(2) Subsection (1) does not preclude any law, program or activity 
that has as its object the amelioration of conditions of 
disadvantaged individuals or groups including those that are 
disadvantaged because of race... 
 
Equality before or under the law means that Canadians are subject to the 
same entitlements.  An individual or group is neither privileged nor disadvantaged 
in contrast with other Canadians as a result of laws that would unfairly 
discriminate on the basis of the identity characteristics identified or read into the 
section.  Section 15(1) protects Canadians from unjustly discriminatory laws and 
ensures Canadians are all entitled to the same beneficial results of these laws.  
Subsection 2 ensures that it is possible to design laws that benefit an already 
disadvantaged group so that conditions that prevent people from enjoying the 
protections and benefits enjoyed by other society members may be redressed.   
In a watershed case that interpreted s. 15(1), Andrews v. Law Society of 
British Columbia (1989)
6, it was acknowledged by the Court that “every 
difference in treatment between individuals under the law will not necessarily 
result in inequality and, as well, that identical treatment may frequently produce 
                                                          
6
 In Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia (1989), Mark David Andrews, a 
British citizen and permanent resident in Canada, argued against citizenship as a 
requirement for qualification for the provincial bar.  The Supreme Court ruled that 
s. 15(1) had been violated but that the law was saved by s. 1.   
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serious inequality” (p. 25).   The Court rejected the ‘similarly situated’ test used in 
Bliss v. Canada (Attorney General) (1979)
7
, a test which parroted the Aristotelian 
principle of formal equality such that law was applied to both men and women in 
the same manner regardless of the material differences between the sexes.  In its 
place, the Andrews test was developed in order to identify s. 15 violations.  The 
test asked whether the law made a distinction based on the enumerated and 
analogous characteristics protected under s. 15; and whether the distinction 
resulted in discrimination.  Justice McIntyre defined discrimination in the 
following way:  
“A distinction...which has the effect of imposing burdens, obligations, or 
disadvantages on such individual or group not imposed upon others, or 
which withholds or limits access to opportunities, benefits, and advantages 
available to other members of society” (p. 34).   
 
Andrews marked a shift in Canadian jurisprudence with respect to the  
principle of equality.  Acknowledging the problems inherent in formal equality, 
the Supreme Court began to determine inequality on the basis of discrimination 
instead of merely differential treatment.      
                                                          
7
 Stella Bliss left work abruptly due to her pregnancy (she gave birth four days 
later), then applied for unemployment insurance six days after giving birth.  Her 
claim was denied because she did not meet the qualifying condition in sections 46 
and 30 of the Unemployment Insurance Act; that is, she had not completed ten 
weeks of insurable employment.  She had to wait six weeks before she was 
entitled to insurance.  Bliss argued in Bliss v. Canada (Attorney General) (1979) 
that the Act violated s. 1(b) of the Bill of Rights.  The Supreme Court ruled 
unanimously that the Bill’s provision of equality before the law had not been 
violated.   
HEALTH TOMORROW, VOL. 1(2013).  
98 
 
This concept, known theoretically as substantive equality, is endorsed 
often in feminist scholarship (Boyd and Sheehy, 1989; Colker, 1992; 2009; 
Porter, 2006; Pothier, 2006).  Substantive equality involves the acknowledgement 
that resources and opportunities are not already distributed equally, and equal 
treatment thus sometimes entails treating groups differently in order to redress 
disadvantage.  Minow’s (1991) dilemma of difference may help clarify what this 
sort of equality is intended to redress: “The problems of inequality can be 
exacerbated both by treating members of minority groups the same as members of 
the majority and by treating the two groups differently” (p. 13).  This kind of 
equality is only rendered meaningful if differences are respected, be they race, 
gender, class, or disability (Hughes, 1999).  Differential treatment for the purpose 
of producing equality requires positive state action, rather than simply a position 
of non-interference.   
In the case of reproductive health, s. 15 has the power to produce state 
obligations to regulate abortion provisions.  Instead of merely protecting women’s 
reproductive decisions from state interference, from overt legal coercion—as s. 
7’s right to security of the person can guarantee—s. 15 includes the state 
obligation to provide services and programs that would aim to correct historical 
disadvantage.  Further, the principle ideally ensures that laws and policies are 
meaningful for all minorities that have been unduly discriminated against.  Thus, 
securing s. 15 rights entails prohibiting treatment that would disadvantage 
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minority groups.  While the s. 7 right to security of the person, along with the 
principle of personal autonomy grounding s. 7, protects women’s right to make 
decisions free from legal coercion, this right does not account for other factors 
that complicate or limit bodily control, such as prejudicial attitudes against 
women’s intersecting identity characteristics.  Such a problem could be redressed 
by invoking s. 15.   
Equality considerations in the matter of reproductive health would ideally 
shift policy focus away from a citizen’s negative rights toward the state’s positive 
obligations.  Stricter guidelines on regulation of service in the Canada Health Act 
would ensure that more conservative provincial governments are not 
implementing administrative strategies to limit abortion access despite abortion 
being a legal right.  The racist, classist, or ableist delivery of services would be 
subject to legal review because they function to limit reproductive access, and the 
poor distribution of a service is an equality matter.  Along the same lines, feminist 
equality theorists like Young (2000) account for how structural inequalities are 
made manifest in violence; violence limits a citizen’s full participation and 
inclusion in a community through fear, intimidation, pain, and trauma.  Violence 
in the form of clinic bombings and attacks against abortion providers use these 
same tools to limit women’s access to reproductive services.   
Why has the Court system remained largely silent on reproductive 
equality, then?  Or, in Rodgers’s words: “If reproductive rights are a key location 
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of women’s social inequality, what accounts for the persistent refusal of the Court 
actively to consider the implications for women’s equality?” (2006, p. 18).  
Attempts have been made, so far in vain, to ground reproductive rights in the s. 15 
right to equality.  In Doe et al. v. The Government of Manitoba (2004), denied or 
limited access to safe and timely abortions was found to violate both s. 7 and s. 15 
(as well as s. 2(a) freedom of conscience) of the Charter, though this judgment 
has been set aside and the decision has not served as a precedent for subsequent 
cases pertaining to reproductive rights (Richer, 2008).  Morgentaler argues in his 
most recent case (Morgentaler v. New Brunswick, 2008) that New Brunswick’s 
Medical Services Payment Act violates s. 7 and s. 15 by excluding abortions 
performed in clinics from its definition of entitled services, but the case has not 
yet proceeded (Richer, 2008).  Inroads have been made, but there is more to be 
done. 
Is Equality Enough? 
 Contained within s. 15 is the promise for positive action—a promise s. 7 
cannot provide—although s. 15 too has shortcomings; of relevance here, state 
obligation for positive action remains vague.  Indeed, Porter (1998) questions 
whether Andrews did enough to move away from formal equality, noting that no 
framework was established for positive action: 
Such an approach [in Andrews] may ensure that positive measures 
addressing particular needs arising from disability, pregnancy or 
systemic discrimination will not be found to be discriminatory, but 
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does not establish the framework for establishing when such 
positive measures are required.  There is a significant further step 
involved between rejecting a ‘same treatment’ model of equality 
and accepting needs arising from the distinctive or pressing needs 
of disadvantaged groups protected by section 15 (p. 73). 
 
In his review of case law after Andrews, he demonstrates that “the 
relatively open-ended comments in Schachter and Haig
8
 with respect to the 
broader ambit of positive obligations were replaced by comments suggesting that 
the issue of positive obligations had somehow been decided in the negative” (p. 
74).  As examples, he quotes J. L’Heureux-Dube in Thibaudeau v. Canada 
(1995)
9: “Although s. 15 of the Charter does not impose upon governments the 
obligation to take positive actions to remedy the symptoms of systemic inequality, 
it does require that the government not be the source of further inequality” (446); 
and C.J. Lamer in Egan v. Canada (1995)
10: “It is clear that Parliament does not 
                                                          
8
 In Schachter v. Canada (1992), Shalom Schachter challenged the 
Unemployment Insurance Act for denying paternity benefits to an adoptive parent 
on the basis that he was not available for work.  The Court in this case reaffirmed 
that s. 15 entailed both negative and positive rights.  The same interpretation of s. 
15 was reiterated in Haig v. Canada (1993), which concerned Graham Haig’s 
ineligibility to vote in the Charlottetown Accord due to his moving out of the 
province.     
9
 In Thibaudeau, the Income Tax Act was challenged for requiring that alimony 
payments be included as a woman’s taxable income.  The Court determined that 
that the Act was not in violation of s. 15.  
10
 In Egan, James Egan and John Norris Nesbit, who were in a long-term 
relationship, challenged the Old Age Security Act, which did not include spousal 
benefits for spouses of the same sex.  Although their appeal was dismissed, this 
was a landmark case for establishing that sexual orientation was an analogous 
prohibitive ground for discrimination under s. 15.   
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have any constitutional obligation to provide benefits” (see Brooks v. Canada 
Safeway Ltd., 1989; Schachter v. Canada, 1992).  The concept of equality was to 
be substantiated, but the substance to this day remains vague.  That is, the state 
allows for positive action to redress inequalities, but offers no framework that 
would ensure the state has positive obligations.   
In Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1999)
11
, a 
further explanation of s. 15 was attempted, which, far from solved the problem, 
and only offered further complications: “to prevent the violation of essential 
human dignity and freedom through the imposition of disadvantage, stereotyping, 
or political or social prejudice” (p. 88).  The term ‘dignity’ refers to an inalienable 
attribute to human beings, something worthy of esteem.  Fredman describes 
dignity as “valuable in underscoring the role of equality in situations in which 
there is no obvious comparator, making it impossible to demonstrate the demand 
of formal equality” (2011, p. 22).  The concept of human dignity may solve the 
problem of tricky comparisons, but it moves further away from the framework for 
positive action recommended by Porter.  This standard was associated with 
freedom—the freedom to make decisions and determinations unburdened by legal 
constraints.  Lawrence (2003, 2006) argues that the rhetoric of freedom found in 
                                                          
11
 In Law, 39-year-old widow Nancy Law challenged the Canada Pension Plan 
on the grounds that she was denied survivor benefits due to her age.  The Court 
determined that there was no violation under s. 15. 
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Law was used to the detriment of the larger scope that s. 15 was meant to 
encompass: 
The Supreme Court has said that the interests protected by human 
dignity relate to the realization of personal autonomy and self-
determination, self-respect, and physical and psychological 
integrity and empowerment.  This statement of purpose tends to 
obscure the possibility that section 15 is meant to prevent the 
subordination of groups, whether through systemic or other forms 
of discrimination (2006, p. 117). 
 
She goes on to critique the liberty paradigm: “it does not simply thwart the 
claims of equality seeking groups—it actively retrenches societal mechanisms 
which serve to support inequalities, whilst detaching these inequalities from 
plausible claims of discrimination” (p. 132).  Systemic disadvantages fall to the 
wayside because they cannot be accounted for with the language of personal 
autonomy used to articulate the human dignity standard.   
This standard of human dignity was abandoned in later case law, when in 
R. v. Kapp
12
 (2008) the Supreme Court returned to the Andrews discrimination 
standard for determining inequality; although, the general concern around positive 
obligations persists.  Justice Wilson’s words in Morgentaler continue to ripple 
                                                          
12
 In this case, a communal fishing license was granted exclusively to Indigenous 
people; commercial, mainly non-Indigenous fishermen contested the license when 
they were arrested for fishing at a time prohibited by the license, and argued in 
Court that they were discriminated against on the basis of race.  The Court ruled 
that the license was not a violation of equality rights because s. 15(2) enables 
governments to create programs that are meant to ameliorate situations for 
disadvantaged groups.   
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through Canadian jurisprudence: she argued that underpinning all Charter rights 
is a call to respect liberty.  As long as Courts remain preoccupied with honouring 
personal autonomy, they might well continue to interpret Charter applications 
broadly and negatively.  However, this shortcoming does not belong to s. 15 
alone, for the entire Charter may be read as a shield when it needs at times to be a 
sword.  The application of s. 15 to reproductive health would at the very least 
facilitate conversation in the Court system about the interpretation of s. 15.  That 
conversation would be of crucial importance given that legal decisions build upon 
previous decisions.  The tools at our disposal may be blunt, but among them all an 
equality rights approach has already laid the groundwork for positive state action.  
Conclusion 
 This article has sought to identify the implications of taking an autonomy 
approach to reproductive health.  It has argued for positive state obligation, in 
other words, the active intervention of the state in order to redress social 
inequalities.  Although s. 15 has yet to produce a framework that would ensure the 
state upholds its duties to act positively, according to the rhetoric s. 15, equality is 
meant to be substantive in character.  The application of s. 15 to reproductive 
health could not only lead to fairer reproductive access, but might also hold 
Canadian Courts more accountable to their claims about equality rights.      
 Morgentaler was the watershed moment for reproductive rights in Canada, 
and that achievement should be neither forgotten nor downplayed.  Decades after 
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the case, however, we face strikingly similar conditions that existed pre-
Morgentaler: a country where abortion provisions continue to be unregulated and 
thus inconsistent; where access is complicated by insurance, distance, hospital 
closures, shootings, and the list goes on and on; where women’s ability to carry 
out a difficult decision is limited, not legally, but by pro-life billboards on the 
highway and Catholic shame.  We must consider the possibility that autonomy is 
not enough.  That autonomy is not even possible if social inequality deprives 
women of the meaningful options necessary for exercising the right.  Canada 
cannot rest its reproductive health law on Morgentaler alone.  The application of 
equality rights would mark a positive step forward in the right direction.   
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